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Unsettled Peace? The territorial politics of  




This paper analyses the role of roadbuilding as a processes of state territorialisation in post-
war Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of a brutal civil war (1983-2009), and in lieu of a broader peace 
and reconciliation process between Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities, road 
infrastructure has been promoted by the state as essential to the region’s recovery and 
nation’s sovereignty. Roads were to bring national unity and political integration. We 
interrogate such claims, drawing on fieldwork conducted in Jaffna and neighbouring areas 
to cast doubt on the prospects of new roads to ameliorate ethnic tensions. Rather, as 
militarised security discourses and policies continue to dominate the Sri Lankan public 
sphere, such schemes can be understood as part of broader Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
project to consolidate territorial control in restive parts of the country. Our research suggests 
that, rather than facilitating rehabilitation and recovery, road networks mirror pre-existing 
fault lines and entrench the privileged position of the military in Sri Lankan society. Such 
shifts do little to avail persistent minority sentiments of political marginalisation, 
aggravating social fractures and re-constituting the hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism.  
Keywords: Sri Lanka, road infrastructure, peacebuilding, territorialisation, securitisation 
 
Introduction: 
“As we had got off the tuk-tuk near the small kade (boutique), a man at the shop asks in 
Tamil, ‘why are you here?’ I thought I sensed aggression in the question – which must be 
because we had inquired whether there was a Sinhala village in the area….” 
 
These excerpts from the first authors’ fieldnotes recount fieldwork encounters travelling 
to Navatkuli (a village adjacent to the A9 highway linking Jaffna and Colombo), and intimate 
at the residual sense of mistrust that prevails between communities in the former warzones 
of Northern Sri Lanka. The previous day, when we were travelling to Kodikamam, a Buddhist 
temple to the right was noticed, and we had a discussion about why that temple was built 
there? VK mentioned that there was a Sinhala village adjacent to it, which was probably 
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worthy of exploring, given as it was on the A9 route; which is what led to our visit the next 
day.  This visit, and our subsequent visits to the village, were instructive for revealing what 
roads signified to the different communities – in Navatkuli, the Tamil and Sinhala people. We 
open our paper with two contrasting perspectives of what the post-war context has meant 
for the lives of Tamil and Sinhala villagers residing in the vicinity of newly built and 
reconstructed roads. 
 
“The Buddhist temple and statue has not been there for more than five years.  In 2008, as 
the area was recaptured by the state, overnight a settlement came up with 56 Sinhala 
families being resettled and the army hastily constructing takaran (aluminium) shacks. 
Some families had come voluntarily while others, we are told, were forcibly relocated. The 
setting up of a Sinhala village created a lot of tension at the time, about who owns the land 
and whether outsiders can be resettled like that overnight – not even the local MP and GS 
(gramasevaka – village official) seemed to have any idea…  Local Tamil families feel 
aggrieved because some of us do not have land and property to live, and yet outsiders were 
relocated here and given houses…Only a few of those families had ever lived in the Jaffna 
area before…” 
- Tamil rendition 
 “We used to live near the Jaffna railway station before the war began.  Some of us were 
initially displaced to Mihintale, others to Anuradhapura – because of the purge by the 
LTTE…  We moved here in 2008 and prior to us settling in this village, it was a LTTE guhuwa 
(stronghold).  While we were away, we have had children and grandchildren, and they are 
quite settled in Mihintale or Anuradhapura; they didn’t want to move and only visited here.  
This is partly because there are not any Sinhala-language schools in the area….  The A32 is 
a real boon to keep these family connections going; it connects one area with another 
because of the Poonakary bridge and eases travel…the roads are smooth and our bus 
journey is quicker….”   
- Sinhala rendition 
Nearly a decade on from a long and bloody civil war, roads offers vital insights into Sri Lanka’s 
still fraught territorial politics. In the postcolonial era, ‘ethnic’ tensions between Sinhalese, 
Tamil and Muslim communities have simmered over the hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhist 
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nationalists within state institutions.1 Grievances erupted in sporadic outbursts of political 
violence before descending into war. From 1983-2009, the Sri Lankan state was locked in an 
armed struggle with the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), separatists who sought to 
establish an independent Tamil state in the North and East of the country. International 
attempts to broker peace were met with little success, and under President Rajapaksa (2005-
2015), whose ‘soft authoritarian’ and nationalist agenda alarmed political observers, fighting 
intensified until the LTTE conceded defeat in May 2009 (Jazeel and Ruwanpura 2009). 
Following its military victory, a triumphant Sri Lankan government declared its ambitions to 
bring peace and stability through reconstruction and development. Rajapaksa displayed 
little interest in making overtures to the aggrieved Tamil minority, having treated the conflict 
as a ‘law and order’ issue, and his administration prioritised security and economic growth 
over ethnic reconciliation (Kelegema 2015: 242; Venugopal 2018). Twenty-six years of armed 
conflict left behind a landscape scattered with landmines, checkpoints, military hideouts, 
and other artefacts of war; and a renewed push for infrastructure lay at the heart of state 
strategy for regional stabilisation and recovery. Across the North and East of the country, 
where violence had been concentrated, roads were badly damaged and destroyed, left 
marred by potholes and in a state of disrepair. Under the patronage of international donors 
and agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and subsequently 
bilateral loans, the Sri Lankan state embarked on a major roadbuilding scheme. In both its 
ten-year National Road Master Plan, published shortly before the end of the conflict (2007), 
and in its Mahinda Chintana (Vision for the Future) policy framework (2010), the government 
hailed the potential of new highways for their ability to transform economic prospects and 
enhance trade competitiveness. Since then, roads have come to constitute a central tenet of 
the state’s neoliberal vision for a new and unified Sri Lanka, embodying the promise of 
modernity, mobility and economic ‘progress’.  
Scholarship on roads and transport corridors has grown in recent years. It considers the 
diverse social imaginaries associated with new road infrastructures, the role of road-building 
infrastructure as an articulation of state power, and the effects this might have on how social 
                                                 
1 The bombings on Easter Sunday (April 21st 2019) and the recent and yet again outbursts of violence targeting 
Muslims and minorities more generally partly signifies the tense undercurrents that have existed between and 
within communities; and how Sri Lanka’s political grievances remain unresolved – although focusing on 
Muslim-Sinhala relations is not the focus of this paper. 
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relations are (re)constituted at different scales (Anand 2006; Dagalou and Harvey 2012; Ennis 
2018; Harvey and Knox 2015 Larkin 2013; Masquelier 2002; Rankin et al 2018; Sabhlok 2017).  
However, experiences of roads differ markedly in post-war or transitional contexts where 
socio-spatial dislocation produce very different effects to what might occur in a peacetime 
setting. The casualties and the disruption caused by war tends to unsettle claims to land and 
intrude upon political memory, which has been the case in Sri Lanka where 40,000 civilians 
are estimated to have died (UN Panel of Experts 2011).  They also complicate reconstruction 
efforts and reshaping the ways in which new material infrastructures are negotiated and 
contested (Baird and Le Billon 2012; Klem 2014; Unruh and Shalaby 2012). Within post-war 
Sri Lanka, the arrival of new roads – often built under the supervision of the military and 
bound up with processes of displacement and resettlement – breeds a potent mix of 
suspicions, anxieties, hopes and desires (see also: Kelegama 2015, Thirangama 2012). Roads 
are conceived of as auxiliaries to broader development agendas, designed to stabilise and 
legitimate political rule in the aftermath of war. This insight opens up new lines of enquiry, 
concerning the complex relations between infrastructure, social unrest and processes of 
brokerage and alliance building within the wider polity. However, the contingent and 
variable effects of roadbuilding in post-conflict Sri Lanka have yet to be fully explored.  
The newfound enthusiasm for roadbuilding schemes presents an opportunity to 
contemplate how movement is enabled or enhanced by such infrastructural forms.  It also 
correspondingly, reflects on whose lives are interrupted or disconnected as roads cut across 
the landscape and reconfigure socio-spatial relations in a manner that railways did during 
the colonial era (Thiranagama 2012; see also Ahuja 2002).   Taking as our point of departure 
the Sri Lankan government’s professed desire to secure the sovereignty of the nation 
through a dense network of roads, we interrogate militarised discourses of security, 
territoriality and development that pervades it.  Differently from existing post-war literature 
on Sri Lanka, by focusing in on roads we show how they become a mechanism for the state 
to exercise power over populations and territory. It does so by simultaneously disrupting 
existing mobilities and creating new ones; and as state-spaces, roads are prone to actualise 
specific relational discontinuities through calculated interventions that fix space to limit the 
parameters of future land-use (Harvey and Knox 2015; Ennis 2018). Our discussion centres 
on the A32 between Jaffna and Navatkuli, a key link road which connects onto the A9, the 
major highway between urban centres in the North and Colombo, the nation’s capital.  
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By focusing on these strategic transport arteries, we develop our argument concerning 
the instrumental use of roads to manage populations under the guise of both ‘development’ 
and ‘security’, exercising power to further the aims of both a militarised capitalism and 
Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalism. In doing so, we aim to contribute to emerging body of 
literature addressing the effects of infrastructure development in warzone or post-conflict 
settings, environments where stabilisation acquires a privileged status in guiding state policy 
(Baird and Le Billon 2012; Klem 2014; Rankin et al 2018; Unruh and Shalaby 2012).  Hence, in 
this paper, we analyse the role of roadbuilding as a constitutive process of the Sri Lankan 
state in its quest to secure legitimacy and consolidate national sovereignty (see also 
Thiranagama 2012 for railways). We begin by briefly outlining our research methods, before 
proceeding to investigate the political significance of roads, mobility and connectivity within 
Sri Lanka’s fractured post-war landscape. 
 
Fragments from the field  
Undertaking research on roads is necessarily a fragmented and fragmentary process, 
requiring movement between a stretch of road and locating field sites that were under 
construction or had been recently completed.  We identified three such pivotal sites within 
the A9 road, a major road and key transport artery connecting Jaffna with urban centres in 
the South; and we worked together with a trilingual local researcher from the Jaffna area 
over a nine-month period (January-August 2017). As a co-author, she facilitated our access 
to village communities, carrying out interviews and translating – where this was 
necessitated.  She and the first author are native to the country and between them speak 
Sinhala, Tamil and English.  One is bilingual (fluent in English and Sinhala) and has a passive 
knowledge of Tamil from previous research carried out in Tamil-speaking areas in the 
country; the other, fluent in Tamil and with a working knowledge of English and Sinhala.  
Hence, we avoided the challenges of being “outsider” researchers and yet had to negotiate 
the insider/outsider to the specifics of the local space.  As a paper authored by four 
researchers, two authors came on board in late 2017 to help gather and analyse policy 
documents and evaluate the empirical data collected.  They helped overcome failures that 
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Harrowell, Davies and Disney (2018) outline due to the unexpected departure and data 
collection gaps by another junior researcher, meant having to compose a partially different 
research team to help finalize the research.  We were all cognisant, however, of our own 
contested positionality vis-à-vis the fragile politics in Sri Lanka.  In conversation with each 
other, we frequently reflected on how the undertaking and completion of research is not just 
messy but also required deliberations on conducting research from near and far – although 
these are issues for a paper on methodology.     
The research sites extended to cover settlements of Navatkuli, Kaithadi and 
Kodikamam, and addressed a broad range of themes, interspersed with more open-ended 
discussions arising from the diverse attitudes towards the state. Our arguments build on 85 
unstructured interviews conducted with local villagers, stall-holders, traders, displaced 
persons, academics, state officials and former combatants, supplemented by empirical 
observations from the field conducted over this period. As the post-war state was a central 
actor in the infrastructure schemes implemented in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka, we also 
carried out analysis of various policy documents that were decisive in shaping reconstruction 
efforts across the country.  We reviewed state commissioned reports that moulded the 
Rajapaksa years alongside NGO assessment reports and newspaper articles that referenced 
the developmental vision articulated by the post-war state.  The Sri Lankan state, however, 
did not operate in a policy vacuum and geo-political void; even as the Chinese state was a 
major financier of the infrastructure bonanza in Sri Lanka,2 policy documents by financial 
institution lenders – i.e. the World Bank and the ADB (Asian Development Bank) – provided 
either the financial support or the economic rationale for a large-scale exercise in 
infrastructure development.  
In state planning, roads are often imagined as ‘connective infrastructures’, professing 
greater mobility, economic development and political integration (Ennis 2018, Harvey and 
Knox 2015, Wilson 2004). This thread is found in the Mahinda Chintana (2010) policy 
framework too.  The Sri Lankan government confidently assures readers that ‘roads 
improvement will also open up opportunities for national integration and political stability… 
the government has accorded the highest priority to improving entire network of roads in 
the country with modern technology’ (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2010: 90). During the 
                                                 
2 The role of China and its close relationship with the Rajapaksa regime in financing infrastructure projects has 
been explored elsewhere (see de Alwis 2010; Kelegema 2014; Venugopal 2018). 
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war, Sri Lanka experienced high levels of growth outside of the war-torn North-East of the 
country through tea plantations, tourism and export processing, allowing for increases in 
funding to the military budget. Market liberalisation and privatisation accentuated 
inequalities and caused a contraction in civilian state employment, but job losses were offset 
and absorbed by the expanding army following a period of ‘military fiscalism’ (Venugopal 
2018). Neoliberal policies intersected with the war economy in other significant ways. Sanyal 
(2006) has directed attention to how the specific form of postcolonial capitalism operational 
in South Asia engenders the generation of wastelands and dispossessed populations, outside 
the logic of accumulation. Armed violence across the North and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka 
compounded the geographically uneven patterns of economic growth, with a war-induced 
wasteland created and perpetuated over three decades. Out of this wreckage, the promise 
of new roads was to herald a new era, bringing the war-town North back into the fold of 
'development'. Such a narrative was instrumental in scripting post-war national identity, 
even if, in reality, this was not much more than a ruse for factory managers entering the north 
in pursuit of cheap labour (Ruwanpura 2018). Within this framework, mobility was lauded as 
the answer to and an integral component of the ‘peace dividend’ promised in the absence of 
war (Goodhand 2010; Kadirgamar 2013; Venugopal 2018). Mobility in this context, is 
assumed to be universal and available to all. However, when the dark reality surfaces that 
mobility is privy to certain individuals or groups at the expense of others, and as the state 
seeks to further its legitimacy under the guise of road development, new and recurring 
insecurities and injustices unravel in aspects of capitalism, territorial politics and 
militarisation, to which we turn to next in the rest of this paper.  
 
 
Roads to Peace?  
Nearly a decade on from Sri Lanka’s emergence out of a bitter and protracted ‘ethnic 
conflict’, prospects for reconciliation remains elusive. Contemporary definitions of peace 
acknowledge how the term refers not just to an absence of overt or direct conflict, but a 
durable or ‘positive peace’ build upon dialogue between communities and grounded in 
mutual respect. This requires a commitment to reconciliation and an absence of structural 
violence, contingent upon steps to combat material inequalities and address outstanding 
grievances (De Mel 2007; Keenan 2016; Orjuela et al 2016, Harrowell and Özerdem 2018).  
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Moreover, despite the cessation of armed combat, competing Sinhala-Buddhist, Muslim and 
Tamil nationalisms that animated the conflict continue to divide Sri Lanka, acting as the 
prism through which politics is performed and subjectively experienced (Thiranagama 2013). 
Whilst successive governments have sought to chart a new path forward, emphasising how 
economic development will be sufficient to overcome social and political fractures, 
memories of conflict retain a firm grip on public life.  Under the tenure of president Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka was consolidated as a centralised and authoritarian unitary state, and 
despite initial optimism following the election of Maithripala Sirisena in 2015, the new 
coalition government has taken few steps to investigate war crimes perpetrated in the 
conflict or promote ethnic reconciliation. Under the Yahapaalanaya ('good governance') 
agenda, the new government did present a bold plan for transitional justice, adopting a 
detailed, UN-sponsored resolution on war reparations (Human Rights Council Resolution 
30/1), but momentum has since floundered (Orjuela et al 2016; Venugopal 2018; Harrowell 
and Özerdem 2018). 
The internal logic of the military has seeped into popular culture, and ‘martial virtue’ 
defines the hegemonic socio-political order (De Mel 2007; see also Hyndman 2015; Klem 
2014; Venugopal 2018). Furthermore, elements of the state have securitised certain 
identities, most visibly Tamil youth and former combatants, and geographical areas (former 
conflict zones, such as the Vanni),3 as ever-present threats that must be guarded against 
through ongoing military supervision and surveillance (Satkunanathan 2016). How, then, are 
roads apprehended in a context where mistrust and enmity persist? 
A senior official of the Roads Development Authority (RDA) in Jaffna assured us that “all 
countries develop roads first in a post-war context, because it is not only concerned with 
infrastructure development but also human reconciliation – to shift attitudes and change 
minds” (3.08.2017). The general public similarly tend to embrace roads, animated by a sense 
of enchantment and “the idea that political and economic stagnation stem from a missing 
relation, a gap, that is felt to impede progress” (Harvey 2012: 81, see also Harvey and Knox 
2015). As in many other ‘developing’ nations, the arrival of paved highways has been 
welcomed by many across Sri Lanka: roads exist as both a symbol and material manifestation 
of modernity, accelerating the flow and circulation of people, capital, goods, and ideas. 
                                                 
3 The Vanni refers to the geographical dry zone in the north-east of Sri Lanka, a sparsely populated territory that 
was formerly a stronghold for the LTTE. 
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Citizens of diverse ethnic and class backgrounds frequently espouse enthusiasm for new 
highways, premised on the anticipation that they would allow for fast, comfortable journeys 
and greater access to markets and job opportunities. In this respect, many seemed to tacitly 
accept the narratives propagated by state authorities, although some were more reticent 
about placing hopes in infrastructure for the reconciliation process.  
These accounts, however, largely overlooked the ways in which the construction of roads 
act to produce and reconfigure space, entrenching the presence and enhancing the visibility 
of the state, as well as inflicting structural violence on certain bodies through spatial 
exclusion. Beyond their ability to connect disparate locations and open access up to 
‘marginal’ territories, the arrival of new roads heralds the initiation of ‘dividing practices’ that 
exclude, overlook or interrupt the mobility of others (Anand 2006; Fluri & Piedalue, 2017).  
The Rajapaksa administration’s expressed intention to ‘build the nation through 
infrastructure’, following the so-called ‘Sri Lanka model’ of counter-insurgency combined 
with early recovery development and stabilisation, has had far reaching consequences. 
Rather than reach out to disaffected communities, the government sought to consolidate 
control in the North and East of the country through quelling spaces of unrest and thus 
“stabilising a victor’s peace” (cf. Goodhand 2010). Yet paradoxically, ‘stabilisation’ holds out 
the possibility of undermining long-term possibilities for durable peace, insofar as it 
presupposes an ambivalent and uneven bundle of power relations. Any political concessions 
around autonomy and federalism was seen to undermine the foundation of the nation.  Thus, 
the state seeking to consolidate its hegemonic position in the period of post-war 
reconstruction, maintaining a military presence to supervise and monitor securitised 
populations even as it endeavoured to win popular support and legitimate its rule (Jazeel and 
Ruwanpura 2009; Authors 2018; Harrowell and Özerdem 2018).  
Along the A9, the principal highway linking the war-ravaged North with Sri Lanka’s 
prosperous South, potholes have been replaced with a smoothly paved carpet road, 
ostensibly fulfilling the pledge to deliver the dream of ‘development’,4 and yet, ‘many 
injustices, such as lost land, lost family members, and other disappearances, have been 
swept under these roads that are meant to demonstrate modernity and prosperity’ 
                                                 
4 Sanyal (2006: 107) identifies how, with the onset of decolonisation from the 1940s onwards, ‘development’ 
came to be perceived as systemic change to be brought about by purposive, rational action on behalf of 
planners and technocratic experts. 
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(Hyndman and Amarasingam 2014: 564). As one Muslim woman lamented, ‘Yes, we have a 
better road now, but it is no medicine for the wound in our hearts’ (23.06.2017). She spoke of 
returning to her home after the war to find it ransacked, with all her possessions gone and 
nothing but an empty floor in their place, whilst a Tamil shopkeeper recounted how, in his 
hometown Navatkuli, new road construction has been accompanied by the resettlement of 
fifty Sinhala families from the South as part of a conscious effort by Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists to cement a presence in the region. According to his account of events, ‘they 
[Sinhala settlers] came in 2010 after the opening of the A9, they came at night with the help 
of army and they settled down here within the one day’ (27.02.2017). Such provocations do 
little to heal the wounds inflicted by decades of war, and the resumption of a State of 
Emergency (granting additional powers to the police and the military) has only heightened 
tensions. As part of the hybrid, militarised governance regime operational in the region, all 
humanitarian and relief programmes were subject to a restrictive vetting and clearance 
process before proceeding, compounding acquiescence to the priorities and rationale of 
securitised modes of development. Even now, surveillance practices remain rife, aided and 
abetted by the military in order to acquire intelligence on the latent Tamil ‘threat’ and since 
Easter Sunday (2019) Muslim extremism (Goodhand 2012; Satkunanthan 2016; Orjuela et al 
2016; Harrowell and Özerdem 2018; Venugopal 2018).  
In this context, the arrival of new roads – often built under the supervision of the military 
and bound up with processes of displacement and resettlement – breeds a potent mix of 
suspicions, anxieties, hopes and desires (see also: Thiranagama 2013; Kelegama 2015). 
Roads are conceived of as auxiliaries to broader development agendas, designed to stabilise 
and legitimate political rule in the aftermath of war, as well as bridges for (re-)connection 
across different ethnic identities.  Thiranagama (2012) shows how railway lines and train 
journeys similarly enact physical and symbolic representations of stateness, where 
nonetheless the individual, community and state become entangled. This insight opens up 
new lines of enquiry, concerning the complex relations between infrastructure, social unrest 
and processes of brokerage and alliance building within the wider polity. However, the 





Capitalism, militarism and mobility  
The Sri Lankan state made virtue out of its road network by way of engaging a range of 
dazzling statistics. For instance, road density, it is claimed, was among the highest in Asia: 
“the number of road kilometres per population exceeds the related indicators of both 
Pakistan and of densely populated Bangladesh” (Ministry of Highway and Road 
Development 2007: 1). The road system was to be elevated as an item of national pride, a 
symbolic marker of Sri Lanka’s superior development vis-à-vis its neighbours. In this policy 
discourse, highways are endowed with all the properties required for a modern, ambitious, 
forward thinking nation; but infrastructural plans remain cloaked in the technocratic 
language of prudence and responsibility. The state promises to ‘strike a rational balance 
between the need to maintain, rehabilitate, and modernize Sri Lanka’s road system,’ 
creating an ‘efficient and competitive’ transport system, aided by ‘a programme monitoring 
system…that will set targets and determine accountabilities, ‘(ibid: 5). Such claims seem – at 
least in part - designed to assuage the concerns of international donors and other 
‘development partners’. In practice, however, these assurances have been harder to 
reconcile with the messy, unsettled experiences of the region’s violent past.  
The expectations of economic advancement that roads will bring, as typified in the 
rhetoric of ‘inclusive’ economic growth and rational development planning, has proven 
difficult to disentangle from decades of war. As Unruh and Shalaby (2012) highlight, the 
provision of road infrastructure in fragile, post-war zones is not equivalent to stable settings. 
There are profoundly different dynamics at play which create new dilemmas and 
contradictions, especially around land tenure and corruption, and unpredictable outcomes 
associated with a refusal to engage with the complex realities of communities beset by loss, 
alienation and economic hardship. The viewpoints manifest in planning documents reflect 
discredited modernisation theories of unilinear development, whilst overlooking historically 
constituted inequalities manifested within symbolic and cultural as well as politico-economic 
fields of power (Harrowell and Özerdem 2018; Authors 2018; Rankin et al 2018). As the war 
officially ended with defeat of the LTTE in 2009, the Government of Sri Lanka entered into 
an agreement with World Bank for assistance delivering the Emergency Northern Recovery 
Project (ENREP) to resettle internally displaced persons (IDPs), commence cash-for-work 
livelihood assistance programmes, and rebuild and expand infrastructure. Concurrently, The 
Asian Development Bank provided a $90 million loan to develop 370 km of provincial roads 
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in the Eastern Province and North Central Province of Sri Lanka. Yet despite the rigorous 
stipulations for monitoring and evaluation insisted upon by international donors, many Sri 
Lankans continue to harbour scepticism, claiming that roads in the Jaffna peninsula were 
constructed to feed the ambitions of local politicians or satisfy external agendas. According 
to one road construction supervisor working on the Point Pedro Road noted that the process 
for awarding contract is unashamedly ‘political’ (i.e. who knows who) and army and naval 
companies are awarded many contracts. Such perceptions were commonplace and 
articulated by many residents we encountered in the vicinity of newly built or restored roads. 
One local trader lamented the elements of political patronage he claimed were decisive in 
determining priorities around transportation infrastructure: 
If there are any important politician’s homes nearby, roads are developed but for our 
poor rural communities they are not developed. I have informed the DS officer several 
times about our road problem, but it is of no use…When it is election time, only then do 
they come and do anything (02.16.2016 Kaithady).  
 
Suspicions of corruption and vested interests stand at odds with official development 
narratives, which cater to an audience of international donors by positing roadbuilding as an 
essential part of the country’s economic recovery. Indeed, speculation regarding corruption 
and kickbacks, particularly through loans from Chinese companies, was a recurrent theme in 
our conversations, although we do not interrogate the same here. The widespread 
perception of nepotism and corruption in roadbuilding programmes is indicative of broader 
class, ethnic and gender dynamics.  Its temporality in Sri Lanka’s political fabric is captured 
by Perera-Mubarak (2012) and Orjuela et al (2016) at two distinct moments – post-tsunami 
and in the immediate aftermath of war.  The fact that the technical functions of roads may 
then be peripheral to the space created for awarding government contracts and enabling 
patron-client relations to flourish resurfaced (see also Thiranagama 2012). Accordingly, the 
priorities and agendas of planners and financial institutions may differ significantly from local 
mobility and transportation needs, contingent upon opaque political networks to benefit 
allies of the ruling parties and with limited outlets for organised political dissent. Echoing 
these views, a print shop owner based near Jaffna complained that the A9 had been 
prioritised for similarly political purposes, with the need for local link roads overlooked:  
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If they invest in the Northern Province, the government thinks that funds will go to the 
LTTE, but this will not go into their hands, even though the state thinks like that; so, there 
were not any development in the war period. After the defeat of the war, they started with 
roads. There is a political reason for this: first, they developed the A9 road because there are 
around 100,000 army personnel in Jaffna, who needed to travel between Colombo and 
Jaffna and that is why they developed A9 road. Yet, there are a lot roads, internal roads, 
which are still not developed; these roads are needed for local people…The government 
didn’t consider the people’s needs, they considered only their own purposes and 
development (15.02.2017). 
 
The prominent role of the military in post-war development extends to commercial 
enterprise and has stoked further controversies surrounding the takeover of unoccupied and 
therefore ‘vacant’ land.  Roads hence bring uneven economic effects, because as Hyndman 
(2004) notes, mobility is political because of the differentiated relationships people have to 
movement and their capacity for this.    For instance, Kadirgamar (2013) shows how faster 
roads may have expanded markets but they have also undermined local production.   Hence, 
the combination of neoliberal economic policies with centralised and authoritarian forms of 
social control have taken their toll on local populations; with roads disrupting regional 
dynamics of the market and production.  This rationalising of spatial scales integral to 
regional power geometries are neglected in nation-building and market connectivity 
narratives. Or, as Wilson (2004) notes it was multiple routes and pathways, rather than a 
single highway or major road artery, which ensured that local communities were not 
impoverished as it eased regional or local autonomy and food security, a point often 
forgotten by proponents of major road building initiatives. 
Roads Development Authority (RDA) trainee engineers who emphasised the increased 
safety, comfort of journeys between Jaffna and the south, and quicker access to hospital 
facilities in the capital, evaded the fact that roads may have been designed primarily to 
benefit affluent urban elites and trading networks, whilst neglecting local needs and 
difficulties with local transportation links. With the arrival of major new thoroughfares, the 
situation is somewhat akin to how Scott (1998: 121) describes the newly constructed city of 
Brasilia: ‘there are no streets in the sense of public gathering places; there are only roads and 
highways to be used exclusively by motorized traffic.’ Augmenting existing critiques of 
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neoliberal growth and development narratives, Gupta (2012) has discussed how bureaucratic 
logics function in a South Asian context, to generate the appearance of decisive action whilst 
doing little to remedy structural violence inflicted upon the poor. Micro-practices of 
corruption become enmeshed with ‘normal’ bureaucratic procedures and routinised within 
the minute texture of everyday life (ibid: 76). More dramatically, in several well publicised 
examples, the Rajapaksa regime arrayed public resources as part of a neo-patrimonial state 
apparatus, awarding contracts to maintain loyalty from its clients and silence critics in the 
public sphere (Perera-Mubarak 2012, Thiranagama 2012, 2013). Despite the purported desire 
of the succeeding Sirisena government to start on a clean slate, many development projects 
proceeded unabated – in part reflecting the multiple scales and dispersed powers of 
government, bipartisan corruption, the politically significant role of Chinese investment and 
state-backed loans to fund infrastructure expansion (see Kelegema 2014, Rajasingham-
Senanayake 2018, Venugopal 2018). However, these explanations overlook important 
factors; we find it instructive to scrutinise how these practices are entangled with securitised 
discourses of nation-building and contested claims of land, identity and belonging. 
 
Securing the nation: Infrastructure and its discontents 
Since the war’s end, the state has adopted a triumphalist nationalist rhetoric and 
inculcated a selective remembering of the war through transforming former hideouts, 
training facilities, and other artefacts of war into touristic sites. This feeds into narratives of 
war that uncritically celebrates the defeat of LTTE ‘terrorists’ (Hyndman and Amarasingam 
2014), and a majoritarian nationalist discourse, which frames connectivity across Sri Lanka 
as integral and necessary to ‘secure the country’ and create dominant imaginative 
geographies of security (Ojeda, 2013, Harrowell and Özerdem 2018). Politicians staking their 
legitimacy on the twin tenets of political stability and economic growth mobilise the promise 
of newly built or redeveloped roads to seek out private investment and encourage Sinhala 
migration to the Vanni and the Jaffna peninsula. As Masquelier (2002: 833) comments, ‘roads 
serve as maps that support social memory,’ and in this way reflect and affirm the hegemonic 
positions of state power through how they fix and demarcate space, catering to a particular 
segment of prospective road users and prioritising particular locations. Sinhala-Buddhist 
settlers in Navatkuli identified roads as having made their lives safer and praised new or 
revamped highways for making it easier to explore ‘our country’. Explicit references to peace 
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and reconciliation were largely absent from conversations unless prompted, mirroring the 
tacit silences and words left unspoken in policy discourses. As Ojeda (2013) argues, under the 
seemingly apolitical narratives, a 'cartography of (in)securities' is carved through processes 
of militarisation at the expense of others who are left in further precarity from enhanced 
divisions.  Nevertheless, state institutions alternate between these narratives of victory and 
cautioning against any assumed complacency; there is a precautionary element to 
securitisation, based on combatting potential threats and the notion that conflict could flare 
up again if constant vigilance is not maintained (Hyndman 2015, Harrowell and Özerdem 
2018; see also de Mel 2007).   
A visible military presence, maintained in camps and checkpoints stationed along 
roads and at symbolic sites, exploits Sinhala-Buddhist fears and builds upon the abiding 
sense of moral anxiety that pervades popular discourse. Roadbuilding is rationalised through 
tapping into a desire to protect and claim sacred sites whilst simultaneously exploiting the 
resources channelled into economic recovery and rehabilitation programmes to construct 
strategic roads of prospective value to the Sinhala dominated military across this 
predominantly Tamil region (Hyndman 2004; Klem 2014; Spencer 2016). For example, the 
AB31 road was highlighted as being significant in providing a route from Kodikam and 
Navatkuli to Mannar, on the Western edge of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. Other key roads 
in the region included the AB32 (entirely new), the A9 heading south from Jaffna (rebuilt 
after the war), the B268 which provides an alternative route to the strategic city of Jaffna, 
and the AB32 leading down to Pooneryn and the Muslim majority southwest. In a region still 
recovering from war, the uneven spatial benefits arising from these infrastructural forms is 
guided by the predilection for ‘seeing like a state’, rendering unruly territories legible through 
surveillance, mapping and managing space in a way that makes it more amenable to political 
control by a centralised state apparatus (Scott 1998; see also Ahuja 2004, Thiranagama 
2013).  
Despite the decisive military victory over the LTTE in 2009, the surveillance and 
monitoring of securitised populations and territories continues in the former LTTE 
strongholds of North and Eastern Sri Lanka. Intelligence is gathered by the military through 
varying techniques including social mapping, enlisting or co-opting community members to 
participate in military sponsored events, and facilitating the development of civil security 
committees, which act as surveillance bodies on behalf of the police and contribute towards 
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an overall atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion between ethnic groups (Satkunanathan 
2016). In tandem, the arrival of new expressways and subsequent elimination of journey time 
between, allows for greater ease of access for the military.  The logic of security continues to 
dominate state decision-making in a manner that evokes the biopolitics of whose security 
should be protected at the expense and exclusion of others (Ojeda, 2013). Rather than 
acknowledge the social cleavages exacerbated by surveillance activities, the Sri Lankan 
state’s assumption that economic development can reconcile social differences reflects a 
long running perspective amongst policymakers who view roads as a means to ‘tame and fix’ 
unstable contexts (Harvey and Knox 2015; see also Thiranagama 2012 for railways). As 
Goodhand (2010) observes, “peace and stability, like development, are not value-neutral 
terms. Rather, they are hegemonic projects at the heart of which lie questions of politics and 
power and whose definition of peace and stability prevails” (2010: 344). Acquiescence to 
military authority remains indispensable for obtaining permission to travel, and amid a 
context of resurgent ethno-nationalism, roads must be understood as in keeping with the 
state’s desires to consolidate territorial sovereignty over an imagined ‘primordial homeland’ 
(Kelegama 2015, Thiranagama 2012). The invocation of safety and security is contingent 
upon a process of essentialising and ‘othering’ the defeated Tamil population, contributing 
to a process of Sinhalisation, and incorporating formerly remote regions into the totalising 
project of national development.  
Within this lens, road infrastructure can be viewed as an indelible aspect of 
‘spatializing the state’ and extending 'stateness'; roads like railways then represent the state 
in all its contradictions (Thiranagama, 2012). It reifies its presence through ‘vertical 
encompassment’ to naturalise a sense of authority and legitimacy within unruly territories 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002). It follows that greater mobility precipitates socio-political 
transformation, as roads order and guide and order the circulation and flow of populations, 
goods and ideas but can concomitantly undermine the power of others (see also 
Thiranagama 2012). 
Roads become a mechanism for demarcating state-space, legitimised through legal 
instruments, such as the principle of eminent domain,5 to access land and mark it out as within 
                                                 
5 Under the principle of eminent domain, a product of Western legal systems and bequeathed to the world 
through colonialism and empire, land can be acquired for development projects deemed in the national interest 
through compulsory purchase. In Sri Lanka, this principle is ratified under the Land Acquisition Act of 1950. 
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the purview of the Roads Development Authority (RDA), the Sri Lankan military and others. 
Engaging with this conceptual terrain requires us to consider how infrastructure 
development is constitutive of ‘nested practices of state formation’ (see Rankin 2018: 289). 
In disaggregating the state, we recognise that its multiple constituent parts do not operate 
as a coherent entity; multi-layered structures of bureaucracy and governance produce 
uneven and contradictory effects as laws and statutes are (re)interpreted and (re)negotiated 
at different scales (Gupta 2012). In this scenario, it becomes invaluable to recognise “how 
local cultural codes constitute a regulatory force in their own right, which in turn have a 
constitutive role to play in shaping the practices of the fragmentary, patronage-oriented 
local state” (Rankin et al, 2018: 292). Roadbuilding priorities and agendas are far removed 
from their purported beneficiaries, and the attendant grievances reflect the sense of 
disconnect between political promise and citizens’ lived realities. As one member of a local 
women’s group put it bitterly, ‘We need internal [rural link] roads first because without them 
we cannot even use the main roads!’ Others expressed frustration at the lack of attention to 
local road infrastructure, and the failure of authorities to respond to multiple requests from 
the community to secure additional funding provide a link road to Kaithady, leaving them 
reliant on uncertain funding from NGO sources. Such awkward and messy realities reveal 
ongoing practices of exclusion, gender and class-based inequalities, raising questions about 
whose mobility needs are being met.  
 
Contested landscapes: The territorial politics of roads 
The military-state’s efforts to formalise and manage strategic points of entry and exit 
can be viewed as constitutive of what we might define as territorialisation, a process through 
which the state acts to consolidate control, by rearranging and regulating both people and 
space, and ‘proscribing or prescribing specific activities within spatial boundaries’ 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 388). Through facilitating Sinhala-Buddhist resettlement in 
once remote and ‘disconnected’ Tamil majority regions, roads may further inflame 
grievances as land acquisition and displacement occur. Often, land acquisition has not been 
awarded much compensation; instead, the government employed a discourse of moral 
responsibility for citizens to give over land, framing the issue as a patriotic duty. While the 
Mahinda Chinthana policy document cultivates a sense of unity and collective advancement: 
(Ministry of Finance and Planning 2010), our fieldwork encounters painted a different picture 
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from this optimistic outlook. Over 300,000 Tamils were displaced following the recapture of 
LTTE-controlled territories by Sri Lankan army between 2006 and 2009 (Amnesty 
International 2009), enabling the military to occupy ‘vacant’ land, and road construction has 
played its part in catalysing such changes.  
Tamil women from Kaithady and the surrounding area informed us that they knew of 
friends who returned from refugee camps in the aftermath of war, only to find Sinhalese 
families living on their land. These new settlements were fenced and guarded by military 
personnel or had military personnel living in these settlements (see also Klem 2014). The 
women accused the government of inviting – even incentivising – Southern families to 
relocate to the North and dent the Tamil population, although the government would not 
admit this. This echoes other complaints we heard, the argument that this was part of 
attempts to divide the North and the East. Similar experiences were documented elsewhere, 
such as in Kepapulava, where land was taken by the military, rendering many local Tamils 
with no claim to their own property. In one formerly disconnected and marginal locale in the 
Vanni, houses had been constructed on ‘empty’ land for fifty families along with a Buddhist 
temple by the Sihala Ravaya organization, consolidating a Sinhala-Buddhist presence in 
what had historically been a predominantly Tamil area. According to one woman shop-
owner interviewed (27.02.2017) near Jaffna: 
 
It is 50 families [relocated] there but there are only houses with names, only 15 or 20 
peoples are actually there. Most of the families do not live here permanently, as there is 
no school for their children. Most of the Sinhala families in the area had been living in 
Maniyanthottam. The houses they live in were built by the Sinhala Ravaya organization. 
A temple also stands there now, also built by the same organization…it's government 
land but before the military there were LTTE cadres and after that local peoples lived 
there, but those people were relocated in another place by the GS. So, peoples are scared 
of the GS, because now the Sinhala peoples came and settled down here but still there 
are so many Jaffna people living without their own land. 
 
Land tenure regimes are disrupted during war, when families are displaced or flee to 
safety leaving it unclear who has the rights to land. This creates an opportunity for 
reconstruction to benefit certain groups aligned with power-holders (Baird and le Billon 
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2012; Unruh and Shalaby 2012). According to road engineers involved in highway 
construction, compensation packages were introduced only at the behest of the World Bank 
and rolled out in a patchy and inconsistent manner. Others excoriated the dispossession and 
displacement associated with roads:  
 
With road widening comes land acquisition - so we lose our lands. Nearly all the roadside 
areas were agricultural lands – so the roads reduced our livelihood income. Another 
problem is cutting trees, we planted big trees along the roadside but when the 
government comes and builds the roads they destroy the trees, which also impacts our 
lifestyle and climate (09.08.2017). 
 
Such testimony signals to the violent ruptures - and the abiding sense of loss, as much as the 
anticipation for what will follow - that accompanies the spread of road networks. The 
disruptive consequences mentioned inspires reflections on what has been rendered invisible, 
overlooked or neglected in in the process of devising and 'rationalising' national planning 
strategies into a supposedly coherent techno-economic model (Scott 1998).  Yet, as 
Thiranagama (2013) reveals, these moments also show how the people will claim the state 
in unanticipated ways because of the ways in which the war, the LTTE and the militarized 
nature of the Sri Lankan polity.  Notwithstanding, however, Sanyal's (2007) depiction of 
violent rupture arising from ongoing primitive accumulation similarly resonates in this 
context. Indeed, ‘becoming modern…is a process fraught with ambiguity…the process also 
entails breaking away from an immanent ‘past’ in which personal and communal identities 
were safely anchored through the ordering of physical space’ (Masquelier 2002: 833). 
Resettlement was closely aligned with Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism; the houses and temple 
were built by the Sinhala Ravaya organization, whose ideological dispositions – furthering 
an exclusionary discourse of Sinhala-Buddhist superiority - concerned other residents. 
Dissatisfaction with the resettlement process manifested in a two-week long protest in the 
community of Muliathivu, with women and children at the forefront demand that their land 
be returned. The protestors claimed the model village in which they had been resettled 
lacked crucial infrastructure (water, sanitation and electricity) and, more significantly, access 
to arable land for farming or rivers for fishing on which livelihoods depended. For rural 
households with livelihoods are based around farming, land along the saline lagoon was less 
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fertile and thus, less desirable. In poor Tamil majority villages neighbouring the new 
highway, the state/army assumed control of plots of land formerly occupied by LTTE during 
the war, before preparing them for resettlement by Sinhalese migrants. Initially, Sinhala 
settlers arrive, migration endorsed under the auspices of the military and encouraged by the 
state through tax incentives, then gradually, accompanied by new markers of Sinhalese 
identity, such as Buddhist temples and statues. However, this activity produced varying 
effects on the local population, prompted by different experiences of the war and 
expectations of what a post-war country should look like. Narrative wove together Sinhala 
claims of territorial sovereignty – triumphant references to ‘our land’ – with some degree of 
resignation for rural Tamils.  
 
Conclusion  
Through analysing the process of post-war recovery underway in Sri Lanka’s devastated 
Northern region, we have sought to illuminate how the construction of new roads is used by 
the state to exercise power and consolidate its presence into formerly hostile territories. By 
interrogating the militarised discourse of ‘securing the nation’ that accompanies 
roadbuilding projects; and juxtaposing such narratives with the articulation of diverse local 
perspectives and observations garnered from the field, we aim to contribute the emerging 
body of literature exploring how emergent socio-political formations find resonance in the 
physical transformation of space in post-war settings. As Sri Lanka navigates its transition 
out of ethnic conflict, roadbuilding constitutes an important arena for the state to win 
popular support and consolidate its rule, with the anticipation of greater connectivity and 
economic opportunity bolstering support for infrastructure programmes. However, in 
projects ostensibly designed for the purposes of promoting ethnic reconciliation and the 
political integration of Tamil and Muslim communities, the motives and priorities of Sri 
Lanka’s bureaucratic state often do not align with locally identified priorities. Whilst in part 
fulfilling the promise of mobility and contributing to the reconstruction of the shattered 
Vanni region, roads simultaneously function to extend state territorial control, rendering 
permissible a more active involvement of the military-state apparatus amid persistent 
mistrust and concern at resurgent Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalism.  
Despite official proclamations lauding ‘development’ as a substitute for transitional 
justice and a shortcut to peace, our research suggests a misalignment with the lived 
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experiences and political priorities of the new roads’ supposed beneficiaries. The 
roadbuilding programme, thus far, has spoken to two particular segments of the country’s 
population – Sri Lanka’s capitalist class, whose desire for greater mobility is contingent upon 
increasing access to markets, and Sri Lanka’s militarized state, who between them comprise 
a core support base of the national government. The emergent socio-political formations 
arising from roads deliver uneven benefits and compel some households to give up land and 
acquiesce to resettlement programmes. The preoccupation with economic growth as a route 
to stabilisation overlooks the limits of economic power in reconciling social fractures within 
a population still traumatised, resentful and marred by the effects of war. As such, newly 
paved highways have cemented inequalities, through a selective memory and 
commemoration of war celebrating the downfall of the LTTE, and a precautionary 
development-security nexus, which has dominated decision-making. It is therefore unclear 
that roads and economic growth can act as a substitution for the more difficult but necessary 
work of critical introspection, addressing reparations, truth and reconciliation required in the 
aftermath of war. The logic of securitisation – which insists on invasive state surveillance and 
resettlement as necessary in the face of a latent Tamil and increasing Muslim ‘threat’ – is 
antithetical to such a process. 
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